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Although professionalization and cartelization assume that political staffers have become alienated 
from parties, research indicates that many of them are close to their party. Based on unique survey 
data collected among the staff of fourteen Belgian and Dutch parties  (N=1009), this paper offers 
an in-depth analysis of party activism among this under-researched population. Introducing a new 
rational choice framework, I argue that staff recruitment is shaped by forces of supply (candidate 
preferences) and demand (party preferences). Findings show that the majority of political staffers 
are high-intensity activists with a strong commitment to their party. Moreover, the theoretical 
model accurately predicts that non-activists are more common among policy – and communication 
experts, ministerial staff and those working for ideologically moderate parties. These observations 
challenge existing assumptions about professionalization and raise normative questions on internal 
congruence within parties in coalition governments. 
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Introduction 
Despite the central position of political staffers in contemporary parties, only a few top advisors 
are known to the public. However, infamous advisors such as Steve Bannon, Alastair Campbell or 
Martin Selmayr are just the tip of the iceberg. Below the surface, a much larger unelected elite of 
staffers remains hidden. Amid a growing research interest for parliamentary staff (Pegan, 2017; 
Hertel-Fernandez et al., 2018) and ministerial advisors (Shaw and Eichbaum, 2018; Taflaga and 
Kerby, 2019), political staff remains “one of the most under-researched fields in study of political parties” 
(Webb and Keith, 2017: 40). A few notable exceptions aside (Webb and Fisher, 2003; Karlsen and 
Saglie, 2017), party scholars have refrained from studying this notoriously elusive population 
(Webb and Kolodny, 2006; Webb and Keith, 2017). In fact, public administration scholars have 
noted that the party perspective is often missing from this discussion (Silva, 2017; Hustedt and 
Salomonsen, 2014). This paper lifts the veil on this unelected but pivotal elite by analyzing original 
survey data (N=1009) collected among fourteen Belgian and Dutch parties.  
Focusing on staffers’ party activism, this paper examines a central assumption behind influential 
theories on professionalization and cartelization (Katz and Mair, 1995; Panebianco, 1988). 
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According to both theories, increasing professionalization leads to alienation between political 
staffers and parties. In contrast to highly committed party bureaucrats of the past, contemporary 
political professionals are assumed to emphasize “the cash nexus of an employment contract instead of 
partisan loyalty or ideology” (Katz and Mair, 2009: 759). Conventional wisdom among party politics 
scholars claims that parties’ central offices have become vehicles of ‘professional campaigning’ and 
parties’ public faces have ‘depoliticized into policy-making bureaucracies’ (Krouwel, 2012: 244). However, 
empirical studies in European parliamentary democracies indicate that most staffers are party 
activists (Fisher and Webb, 2003; Karlsen and Saglie, 2017). 
This in-depth study of staffers’ party activism tackles this apparent contradiction between theory 
and empirical observations via two research questions. First, the general level of party activism 
among political staffers is investigated (RQ1). Second, I examine whether their party activism is 
similar across the population of political staffers. Are non-activist staffers more common among 
specific staff positions, party faces or parties (RQ2)? Based on a original rational choice framework, 
I argue that forces of supply (candidate preferences) and demand (party preferences) stimulate the 
recruitment of party activists. However, I argue that Panebianco’s description of 
professionalization (1988) has affected specific subgroups of staffers. Non-activists are more likely 
to be recruited for staff positions requiring extra-political expertise, in ministerial offices and 
mainstream parties. The empirical analysis aligns with earlier studies and supports the proposed 
framework.   
This contribution advances research on political staff on several fronts. First, it enhances 
conceptual clarity by introducing a clear definition of political staff and developing a fine-grained 
typology based on staffers’ principal activities. Second, the theoretical section bridges the existing 
gap between theory and empirical work by proposing an original rational choice approach to 
explain why most staffers in parliamentary democracies are party activists. Moreover, I reinterpret 
Panebianco’s seminal work (1988) to identify which types of positions are more likely to attract 
non-activists. Third, the empirical analysis is based on extensive data collection that overcame the 
practical hurdles of researching parties’ inner workings. To my knowledge, it is the first time a 
survey project covers more than a thousand staffers spread across three party faces (central offices, 
party groups and ministerial offices) from fourteen parties in several countries. Fourth, the 
conclusion reflects on the democratic legitimacy of this unelected elite. On the one hand, recruiting 
party activists ensures that staffers share the political objectives of voters and members. On the 
other hand, this mechanism appears to be the weakest for those staffers who matter the most.  
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Conceptualizing political staff  
Political staffers are an elusive, understudied population in party politics (Webb and Keith, 2017). 
In this section, I introduce a definition and a typology to conceptualize the population of interest. 
Political staffers are individuals with a remunerated, unelected position that have been politically 
recruited within a party’s central office, parliamentary party group or ministerial office. This 
definition includes four necessary conditions for belonging to the population of interest studied in 
this paper (Table 1). 
Table 1: Key characteristics of Political Staffers 
Criterion Exclusion 
Remuneration Volunteers 
Unelected position Elected officials 
Political recruitment Civil servants 
Inside organization/institution Independent consultants 
 
First, political staffers receive a salary in return for their activities, which sets them apart from 
volunteers like party members. Although volunteers remain relevant to the political process, the 
focus of this paper are the individuals who are directly employed within party organizations, party 
groups or ministerial offices. The origin of their salary can either be the party payroll, the 
parliamentary party group or a ministerial office (Webb and Kolodny, 2006; Monroe, 2001). 
Second, political staffers hold unelected positions, which sets them apart from elected officials 
like party leaders, MP’s or ministers. In contrast to elected elites, staffers are appointed by party 
organizations or elected officials after a non-public recruitment process. In general, they operate 
behind-the-scenes, remaining invisible to the public at large (Laube et al., 2020). Third, political 
staffers are directly recruited by party organizations or elected elites, which sets them apart 
from civil servants. Admittedly, the civil service can itself be subject to party patronage (Kopecký 
et al., 2012) and a considerable portion of staffers has professional experience or future ambitions 
as a civil servant (Karlsen and Saglie, 2017). However, such ‘hidden professionals” within the civil 
service (Panebianco, 1988: 234) are excluded because this would make the population of interest 
very heterogeneous and practically impossible to identify. Fourth, staffers are employed by party 
organizations, parliamentary party groups or ministerial offices, which sets them apart from 
external campaign consultants (Farrell et al., 2001) and firms who offer parties PR – and digital 
services (Dommett et al., 2020). Although Panebianco’s seminal work on professionalization did 
include such external actors, the author explicitly addressed internal staffers as well (Panebianco, 
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1988: 229-231). By including both party (group) staff and ministerial staff, this study is the first to 
bridge the conceptual divide between two separate research traditions: one focusing on ministerial 
policy advisors (Shaw and Eichbaum, 2018), another consisting of party politics scholars who have 
studied party staff (Webb and Fisher, 2003; Karlsen and Saglie, 2017).  
Staff typologies 
Panebianco’s seminal typology of party employees made a distinction between bureaucrats and 
professionals (1988). Compared to the supportive ‘line role’ of party bureaucrats, highly-educated 
professionals took on advice-oriented ‘staff roles’ (Panebianco, 1988: 229-231). While Panebianco 
certainly identified an important shift within political organizations, this binary distinction is too 
crude to fit the practice of contemporary party politics. Several authors have demonstrated that 
most political staffers are professionals to a certain degree (Webb and Fisher, 2003; Salisbury and 
Shepsle, 1981) and the concept of professionalism has been criticized for obscuring rather than 
clarifying (Lilleker and Negrine, 2002). 
Karlsen and Saglie (2017) describe four types of staffers based their tasks: communication adviser, 
political adviser, organizational adviser and administrative position. The typology presented in this 
paper is an expansion of Karlsen and Saglie’s (2017) work. Based on staffers’ principal activities, it 
makes a fine-grained distinction between six categories: managers, policy experts, communication 
experts, political assistants, party organizers and administration & support (Table 2). Compared to 
Karlsen and Saglie (2017), the extensive core group of political advisers was split up for two 
purposes. First, the principal activities of staffers within these six categories are more 
homogeneous. The activities of managers in leadership roles are very different from the personal 
assistants of MP’s. Second, this categorization aligns with Panebianco’s focus on extra-political 
expertise (1988). For instance, the specialization of policy experts originates outside of politics. 
Their expertise can easily be applied in other organizations or industries. In contrast, managers, 
political assistants and party organizers specialize in areas unique to political organization or – 
representation. 
Although staffers’ contribution to politics is often designed to remain ‘invisible’ (Laube et al., 2020), 
their pivotal role is irrefutable if the full scope of their activities is considered. Managers ensure 
that the political machine runs smoothly. As central figureheads, they are responsible for translating 
a party’s political-strategic goals into an effective political operation. In this role, they often 
coordinate with elected elites and monitor the activities of other staffers as people managers. Policy 
experts provide elected elites with tailored policy advice by drafting legislative documents and 
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writing briefings (Maley, 2000; Busby and Belkacem, 2013; Gouglas et al., 2015; Pittoors et al., 
2017; Wolfs and De Winter, 2017). In ministerial offices, they often coordinate with policy experts 
from other coalition parties (Maley, 2011; Askim et al., 2018) and civil servants (Askim et al., 2017; 
Connaughton, 2015). Communication experts help elected elites to connect with voters 
effectively in a mediatized political environment. They run electoral campaigns and promote the 
(social) media presence of elected elites on a daily basis (Askim et al., 2017; Dommett et al., 2020; 
Sabag Ben-Porat and Lehman-Wilzig, 2020).  
Table 2: Staffers’ individual tasks 
Managers Director (central office, ministerial office), party group secretary, head of general 
policy (ministerial office), cabinet secretary (ministerial office) 
Policy experts Policy advice (party study service, party group or ministerial office) 
Communication 
experts 
Director of communications, communication cell staff, spokesperson (party 
leader, party group or minister), internal party communication staff, translator, 
public relations staff 
Political assistants Personal assistant (party leader, MP or minister), parliamentary liaison 
(ministerial office) 
Party organizers Coach of local sections/campaigns (central office), experts in local policy 
(central office), assistants to party subgroups (youth, women, elderly, ...)  
Administration  
& support 
Finance and accounting, human resources, IT, reception, administration, 
catering (central office or ministerial office), personal driver (party leader, 
minister) 
 
Political assistants are the main sidekick for many individual politicians as they manage the 
practical, daily routines of holding an elected office. In this role, they act as gatekeepers to elected 
elites by managing their daily schedule (Busby and Belkacem, 2013) and organizing constituency 
services (Landgrave and Weller, 2020). Party organizers support the party on the ground as the 
available pool of volunteers to run the party on the ground becomes increasingly limited (Scarrow, 
2014; Van Biezen et al., 2012). In this role, they support local office-holders, candidates and party 
members (Super, 2009). Lastly, staffers in the administration & support category are part of the 
collective support structure of a specific party, party group or ministerial office and contribute to 
bureaucratic routines or provide operational services to guests, personnel and elected elites.  
Staffers and party activism 
According to influential party models, staffers’ party activism has been decreasing for decades 
(Panebianco, 1988; Katz and Mair, 1995; Hopkin and Paolucci, 1999). Professionalization is 
considered the principal driver behind this evolution, as traditional party bureaucrats are being 
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‘displaced’ by political professionals (Scammell, 1998). A key point of difference between 
bureaucrats and professionals is their relationship to political parties. As described in the seminal 
work by Michels (1915), “the bureaucrat identifies himself completely with the organization, confounding his own 
interests with its interests” (1915: 138). In contrast, political professionals are assumed to lack this 
profound party identification because they have less need for “traditional identity incentives” 
(Panebianco, 1988: 232). Instead of political activism, political professionals emphasize vocational 
values such as technical expertise, career development and professional autonomy.  
However, two empirical studies have demonstrated that party activism among European staffers 
remains strong. In both a single-party study in the UK (Webb and Fisher, 2003; Fisher and Webb, 
2003) and a system-wide study in Norway (Karlsen and Saglie, 2017) the vast majority of political 
staffers were party activists. Most likely, these observations will also apply to other established 
parliamentary democracies, including Belgium and the Netherlands. In the following paragraphs, I 
will develop a rational choice framework explaining staffers’ party activism to close the existing gap 
between theory and empirical evidence.  
Supply and demand 
The recruitment of political staffers is shaped by forces of supply and demand. On the supply-side, 
the preferences of aspiring staffers determine which types of candidates are available. On the 
demand-side, the preferences of parties determine which candidate are selected. By considering the 
preferences of both staffers and parties, I will first argue why parties in parliamentary democracies 
mostly recruit party activists. Second, I will argue why this mechanism is moderated under specific 
circumstances, resulting in a lower prevalence of party activism among some types of staffers.  
On the supply-side, the preferences of aspiring staffers can be approached as an individual cost-
benefit calculus. Evidently, candidates will only apply for a position when they perceive its costs to 
be outweighed by certain benefits. Existing literature indicates that the costs of being a political 
staffers are related to career stability – and development. Firstly, electoral dynamics make politics 
into an insecure professional environment with high turnover rates (Salisbury and Shepsle, 1981; 
Dickinson and Tenpas, 2002). Secondly, returning to the non-political labor market is not without 
risk. Former political staffers might face discrimination due to political affiliation (Baert, 2018). 
Moreover, potential employers outside the political bubble tend to undervalue their professional 
skills (Svallfors, 2016). These professional hurdles can be overcome by considering the benefits of 
being a political staffer. What drives people to become a political staffer in the first place? Most 
importantly, staffers receive remuneration in exchange for their work. However, not all staffers 
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consider their salary to be competitive from a purely economic perspective. Research has 
demonstrated that a considerable portion of staffers is convinced they can find a more lucrative 
position outside of politics (Fisher and Webb, 2003). Hence, I argue that working in politics 
requires additional motivation: the intrinsic desire to contribute to a party’s political objectives. Of 
course, such a cost-benefit calculus is the most favorable to passionate activists within the party 
network. As a result, the supply of candidates is dominated by party activists who fit this profile. 
On the demand-side, party preferences determine which specific candidate is selected. From the 
perspective of parties, hiring staff is a process of delegation (Strom, 2003). As principals, parties 
instruct staffers (agents) to perform a set of tasks in exchange for remuneration. Once they are 
hired, staffers are granted professional discretion – a ‘space of autonomy’ in which they are allowed 
to make their own judgments and decisions (Wallander and Molander, 2014). As illustrated by the 
earlier discussion of staffers’ involvement in day-to-day politics, this area of professional discretion 
often includes important aspects of political decision-making. To ensure that staffers will 
successfully serve their interests within this space of autonomy, parties select candidates that are 
both competent and loyal. Loyalty is important to avoid that staffers would deviate from their 
principal’s interests, namely a party’s strategic and ideological goals (Lupia, 2003). This preference 
for loyalty is key to understanding why parties recruit staffers among their activists.  
Parties aim to minimize the risk that staffers might deviate from its primary goals in the future. For 
this reason, I argue that party activism is a central selection criterion during staffers’ recruitment. 
Admittedly, the loyalty of staffers can also be achieved by other means, such as closely monitoring 
daily activities. In comparison to the alternatives however, recruiting among a party’s support base 
is the most effective approach with several advantages. Party activism signals intrinsic loyalty and 
requires only limited information and energy from recruiters. In effect, parties use a staffers’ party 
affiliation as an informational shortcut to discern which candidates are more likely to act in their 
interests later on.  
H1: The majority of staffers in parliamentary democracies are party activists.  
Recruiting outsiders 
To run an effective and competitive political operation, parties must also maximize the competence 
of their staff. Competence is important because it guarantees that the tasks delegated to staffers 
will be carried out effectively. Although political loyalty is valuable to parties, they will nonetheless 
recruit outsiders because the supply of competent loyalists is limited. For most vacancies, the 
supply of candidates includes sufficient loyalists for a party to select a candidate who is both loyal 
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and competent. For other vacancies, the supply of candidates does not include party activists with 
the desired skills and expertise. When this occurs, parties are forced to make a trade-off between 
loyalty and competence. If a party prioritizes loyalty, the choice is motivated by patronage – 
resulting in the recruitment of an incompetent activist. If a party prioritizes competence, the choice 
is motivated by professionalism – resulting in the recruitment of a competent non-activist.  
The aim of this section is to specify when parties are most likely to prioritize competence by hiring 
outside the party network. I expect parties to recruit non-activist professionals if the situation meets 
two conditions. First, the available staff positions have to be too numerous to be filled by 
competent loyalists. Second, the available staff positions have to offer increased benefits to lure in 
party outsiders who lack the strong commitment of party activists. The remainder of this section 
specifies the situations in which both of these conditions apply.  
On the individual level, numerous typical professional positions require a certain degree of “extra-
political” expertise (Panebianco, 1988: 221). Policy and communication experts make up more than 
half of all staffers (54%; see Appendix B). At the same time, these positions provide additional 
benefits to attract outside candidates: remuneration and influence. Take Panebianco’s example of 
an economic expert at a party research office (1988: 129-130). First, the scarcity of formally-trained 
economists in the labor market exerts upward pressure on their remuneration. After all, this type 
of staff professional can easily fall back on an academic degree to develop a career outside of 
politics. Second, economic experts yield a degree of influence because their area of professional 
discretion includes devising detailed policies with potential societal impact.  
H2: Party activism is less prevalent among staffers in positions requiring extra-
political-expertise.  
On the party face level, ministerial offices offer numerous staff positions. Ministerial aides alone 
account for 49% of all political staffer in this study – about as many staffers as central offices and 
party groups combined (51%; see Appendix B). At the same time, these centers of executive power 
provide additional benefits to attract outside candidates: prestige, influence and career 
opportunities. First, a prestigious position in a ministerial office is beneficial to a staffers’ social 
status. Second, the power of elected ministers has a spill-over effect on their staff. As staffers are 
often motivated by a “desire to affect politics and society at large” (Selling and Svallfors, 2019; Svallfors, 
2017), access to influential elected elites considerably increases the appeal of a particular position. 
Third, ministerial staffers’ access to a network of key decision-makers and their experience in 
government facilitates access to positions within the private sector, lobby organizations and civil 
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service. These career opportunities compensate the costs related to career insecurity (Salisbury and 
Shepsle, 1981; Dickinson and Tenpas, 2002) which might otherwise hold back outside candidates.  
H3: Party activism is less prevalent among staffers from ministerial offices. 
On the party level, mainstream parties employ the most personnel: traditional party families 
(christian democrats, liberals, social democrats) account for a clear majority of staffers (71%; see 
Appendix B). At the same time, the office-oriented nature of such parties offers additional benefits 
for staffers’ career opportunities. In their immediate vicinity, both an established party 
infrastructure and collateral organizations offer many potential positions. Moreover, the moderate 
ideological profile of mainstream parties reduces potential costs. Aspiring staffers are reluctant to 
join ideologically extreme parties to avoid later discrimination based on political affiliation (Baert, 
2018). In contrast, such discrimination is unlikely to affect the former staff of parties with a 
moderate ideological profile. 
H4: Party activism is less prevalent among staffers from parties with extensive 
governing experience. 
H5: Party activism is less prevalent among staffers from ideologically moderate 
parties. 
Data and method 
The analysis will focus on political staffers from Belgium and the Netherlands. Including two 
countries improves the generalizability of the findings and increases variation in party-specific 
variables. For example, the analysis includes three social-democratic parties, each with their own 
specificities regarding staff size, government experience and ideological positions. Due to the 
institutional dominance of parties, Belgium and the Netherlands are most likely cases for strong 
party activism among staffers. As classic examples of consociational democracies (Lijphart, 1984), 
civil society and welfare state institutions were historically structured along party-related pillars. 
Party dominance is reflected in both electoral systems, which combine list proportional 
representation, multi-member districts and party leadership’s influence on the composition of 
ballots (Gallagher, 2005). These factors stimulate parties to behave as collectives and discourage 
personalized behavior among elected elites (Carey and Shugart, 1995). In this sense, Belgium and 
the Netherlands are the exact opposite of the candidate-centered US context (Farrell, 1996; Farrell 
and Webb, 2002), where elected elites individually reside over an enterprise-in-office (Monroe, 
2001) due to the weak position of party organizations . Despite many similarities, the habitat of 
Belgian and Dutch staffers is not identical. The total staff size of Belgian parties greatly outnumbers 
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the staff of Dutch parties (Appendix A) due the higher levels of public funding (Van Biezen and 
Kopecký, 2014) and the existence of extensive ministerial offices (Walgrave, 2004; Brans et al., 
2006).  
Original survey data were collected among the paid staff of fourteen parties (Appendix A). Since 
the support of party leadership was indispensable for contacting the target population, face-to-face 
interviews with senior party management were set up to gain an official endorsement. Although 
parties are often reluctant to provide access to their personnel (Webb and Kolodny, 2006; Webb 
and Keith, 2017), this approach resulted in the participation of 14 out of 25 parties represented in 
the Belgian and Dutch parliaments. Apart from the radical right family (which refused to 
participate), these cases mirror the diversity of the party landscape in electoral size, organizational 
resources and ideological outlook. Before launching the online survey, a carefully-developed 
questionnaire was tested among party staffers during 33 face-to-face interviews.  
Designed to be completed in under 15 minutes, the questionnaire contained general background 
questions on staffers' sociodemographic characteristics, day-to-day professional activities and 
previous professional experiences, but also gauged their political attitudes, future ambitions and 
their interactions with peers and elected elites. Between December 2018 and January 2020, the 
complete population of staffers from the participating parties received a digital invitation to answer 
this online questionnaire, followed up by two reminders. Out of a population of 2936 individuals, 
the survey obtained a response rate of 34% (N=1009). To calculate response rates and check the 
representativeness of our findings, participating parties provided population data. Based on the 
weighted cases approach (Parke, 2012), X2-tests were run to test under – or overrepresentation 
among specific subgroups within the sample. Post-stratification weights were calculated based on 
five indicators with significant differences between sample and population (country, party system, 
party, party face and age).  
The conceptualization of staffers’ party activism in this paper connects earlier research on party 
staff (Webb and Fisher, 2003; Karlsen and Saglie, 2017) to literature on party activism (Whiteley 
and Seyd, 2002). Building on existing in-depth studies on political staff, four indicators of party 
activism were considered: current party membership, membership prior to being hired, internal 
party positions and electoral candidacies (Fisher and Webb, 2003; Karlsen and Saglie, 2017). Based 
on these indicators, staffers were then grouped into three mutually exclusive categories according 
to the work of Whiteley and Seyd (2002) on high-intensity participation. Firstly, high-intensity 
activists actively dedicate a portion of their leisure time to the party. These staffers dedicate 
considerable ‘time and effort’ to the party (Webb et al., 2020), either by holding an internal party 
position (e.g. local section, youth wing, …) or joining ‘the public face of the party’ by standing for 
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elected office (e.g. municipal, regional, national or European elections) (Katz, 2001).Secondly, 
staffers who’s relationship to the party is limited to formal party membership without active 
involvement as volunteers were categorized as low-intensity activists. Thirdly, staffers without any 
link to the party outside of their professional activities were categorized as non-activists.  
Table 3: Response and representation  
by gender, age, party face and country 
 
 
Response rate 
(34%) 
Population 
(N=2936) 
Sample 
(N=1009) 
Gender 
    Female 
    Male  
 
34% 
34% 
 
43% 
57% 
 
43% 
57% 
Age 
   18 - 35 
   36 - 50 
   50 + 
 
38% 
33% 
30% 
 
37% 
38% 
24% 
 
42% 
37% 
22% 
Party faces 
   Central office 
   Party in Parliament 
   Party in Government 
 
45% 
38% 
27% 
 
22% 
30% 
48% 
 
29% 
33% 
38% 
Country 
    Belgium 
    The Netherlands 
 
33% 
47% 
 
89% 
11% 
 
85% 
15% 
 
Staffers’ party activism will be examined on three distinct analytical levels: individual tasks, party 
faces and parties as a whole. First, the individual level is based on the six staff types discussed 
earlier. Second, the distinction between party faces refers to the principal location of their activities: 
the party’s central office, party group or a ministerial office. Third, the analysis will examine the 
link between staffers’ activism and party-specific factors. Government experience is measured as 
the proportion of time spent in national or regional government since the party’s founding 
(multiplied by 100 to facilitate interpretation). Ideological extremity was calculated as the square of 
a party’s distance from the center on the general left-right scale of the 2019 CHES data (Bakker et 
al., 2019). Lastly, the analysis controls for gender and age, as political work is characterized by a 
‘gendered division of labor’ (Snagovsky and Kerby, 2018) and older staffers have had more 
opportunities to get involved as party activists. 
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Results 
To assess the general level of party activism among staffers (RQ1), I start with a descriptive analysis. 
According to the intensity of their activism, staffers were grouped into three mutually exclusive 
categories: non-activists, low-intensity activists or high-intensity activists (Figure 1). This approach 
is more informative than a separate presentation for all four indicator of party activism because it 
captures the combined strength of a staffers’ commitment to the party. For example, a staffer with 
experience as both electoral candidate, internal party activist and longtime party member is more 
intensely connected to the party than a colleague who only bought a membership card. A 
visualization of the separate indicators for party activism (current member, member before being 
hired, internal position and electoral candidate) can be found in appendix B.  
 
Figure 1: Party activism among staffers 
The findings demonstrate that the majority of Belgian and Dutch staffers are committed party 
activists. The largest group of staffers are high-intensity activists who take up an active role within 
the party, either through an internal position (e.g. local section, youth wing, …) or standing for 
elected office on a party list. These staffers can be considered passionate activists who “live for 
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politics” (Weber, 1921). About a quarter of all staffers are low-intensity activists who’s connection 
to the party remains limited to formal membership. Only a small minority of staffers are non-
activists with an exclusively professional relationship to the party. These results firmly support the 
first hypothesis, which stated that the majority of political staffers in parliamentary democracies are 
party activists (H1). 
 
 
  
Figure 2: Staffers’ party activism by tasks, party faces and party families 
 
In addition to the general level of party activism, this paper aims to identify which types of staffers 
have lower degrees of party activism (RQ2). To this end, a multivariate analysis will examine 
whether non-activists, low-intensity activists and high-intensity activists are distributed evenly 
across the population of political staffers. Bivariate analyses demonstrate significant differences 
between individuals, party faces and parties (Figure 2, significance tests in appendix C). Non-
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activists are overrepresented among policy experts, ministerial offices and christian democratic – 
and liberal staffers. In contrast, high-intensity activists are significantly more numerous among 
political assistants, party organizers, central office – and parliamentary staff and conservative – and 
radical left parties. The group of low-intensity activists is significantly larger among social 
democrats.  
To correctly identify which types of staffers have lower levels party activism, three stepwise 
multiple logistic regression models were estimated. Each model examines which types of 
individuals are more likely to belong to a specific category of activists (non-activist, low-intensity 
activist or high-intensity activist). As all three models have identical independent variables, this set-
up facilitates a comparison of the relationship between staffers’ party activism and individual – ,  
party face – and party-level variables. While a comparison of all three models is presented in table 
5, detailed information on these stepwise regressions is can be found in appendix D.  
On the individual level, the link between staffers’ activism and their tasks is limited to a few 
significant results. Compared to managers, both policy – and communication experts are more than 
three times as likely to be non-activists (p<.1). However, there are no significant differences 
between staffers with different tasks when it comes to understanding low-intensity – or high-
intensity activism. On the party face level, staffers who work in ministerial offices clearly stand out. 
Compared to their colleagues at central offices, ministerial staffers are more than three times as 
likely to be non-activists (p<.01). Vice versa, ministerial staffers are less likely to be involved with 
the party as low-intensity activists (p<.05). However, there is no significant difference between 
staffers within different party faces when it comes to high-intensity activism. On the party level, 
both a party’s government experience and ideological extremity are significantly related to staffers’ 
party activism. Government experience is strongly related to all categories of party activism 
(p<.001), but not in a linear way. While party activism is more widespread among office-oriented 
parties (fewer non-activists), it is also more shallow (more low-intensity activists, fewer high-
intensity activists). Lastly, staffers from ideologically extreme parties are less likely to be non-
activists. Surprisingly, ideologically extreme parties do not have significantly more high-intensity 
activists.  
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Table 5: Understanding party activism among political staffers (N=934) 
 
Non-activism 
Low-intensity 
activism 
High-intensity 
activism 
Tasks  (ref.: Managers) 
   Policy experts 
   Communication experts 
   Political assistants 
   Party organizers 
   Administration & support 
 
 
3,73 (0,67) ° 
3,50 (0,72) ° 
3,19 (0,77) 
1,87 (0,97) 
3,15 (0,72) 
 
0,91 (0,29) 
0,85 (0,34) 
0,70 (0,34) 
0,80 (0,44) 
1,10 (0,33)  
 
0,76 (0,33) 
0,91 (0,39) 
1,15 (0,38) 
1,56 (0,57) 
0,89 (0,39) 
Party faces  (ref.: Central Office) 
   Parliament  
   Ministerial office 
    
 
0,59 (0,50)  
3,23 (0,41) ** 
 
0,86 (0,25)  
0,61 (0,23) * 
 
0,99 (0,29) 
1,02 (0,27) 
Parties 
  Government experience   
  Ideological extremity 
 
 
0,98 (0,01) *** 
0,89 (0,04)  ** 
 
1,02 (0,004) *** 
1,00 (0,03)  
 
0,98 (0,004) *** 
0,96 (0,03)  
Control variables 
  Belgium 
  Female 
  Age   (ref.: 18-35) 
    36-50 
    50+ 
 
 
1,57 (0,51)  
1,93 (0,23) ** 
 
0,56 (0,26) * 
0,72 (0,29)  
 
0,81 (0,27) 
1,33 (0,15) ° 
 
1,17 (0,18) 
0,98 (0,21)  
 
1,67 (0,29) ° 
0,65 (0,18) * 
 
1,19 (0,21) 
1,01 (0,24) 
Constant  0,07 (0,89) ** 0,14 (0,47) *** 9,10 (0,53) *** 
Nagelkerke’s R²       0,181        0,092        0,073 
Odd’s ratios & SE’s of multiple logistic regressions; ° p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Although not the main focus of this paper, the results also highlight contrasts between genders and 
political systems. First, women are significantly overrepresented among non-activists. This means 
that, compared to men, female staffers are more often recruited outside of the party network. This 
finding adds to existing studies on staffers’ career developments (Taflaga and Kerby, 2019) and the 
division of labor in political offices (Snagovsky and Kerby, 2018) by demonstrating that staffers’ 
party activism is also gendered. Second, Belgian staffers are more involved high-intensity 
participation (internal position, electoral candidacy) than their Dutch counterparts.  
By and large, the theoretical framework is supported by the analysis. The results confirm that party 
activism is less prevalent among staffers in positions that require extra-political skills (H2). Indeed, 
both policy experts and communication professionals introduce outside expertise into politics. This 
observation applies less to managers, political assistants or party organizers as they specialize in 
uniquely political activities. The findings also show that party activism is less prevalent among 
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ministerial staff (H3). Compared to central office staffers, those who work in ministerial offices are 
more than three times as likely to be non-activists. The analysis does not confirm the expectation 
that party activism is lower among staffers from office-oriented parties (H4). Instead, the findings 
demonstrate that the staff of such parties is concentrated within the middle category of low-
intensity activists. Compared to parties with less government experience, office-oriented parties 
have fewer staffers without any ties to the party – but their actual involvement as volunteers is 
relatively weak. Lastly, staffers from ideologically extreme parties are indeed less likely to be non-
activists (H5).  
A key finding of the multivariate analysis is that staffers’ party activism is closely related to 
contextual factors. While the seminal work of Panebianco (1988) emphasized individual differences 
between professionals and bureaucrats, this analysis demonstrates that individual factors interact 
with the larger context. It is no coincidence that non-activist ‘professionals’ are more common 
among policy – and communication experts, in ministerial offices and ideologically moderate 
parties. Of course, staffers’ party activism is not dictated by the specific position they happen to 
work in. Instead, staffers’ party identification (or lack thereof) determines their party activism and 
affects the types of jobs they apply – and  get selected for.  
The original theoretical framework of this paper works best to identify non-activists. Not only is 
the Nagelkerke R2 value of the first model considerable larger than the others, the higher 
significance levels of the estimates indicate a stronger relationship with the dependent variable. 
This is not surprising, as both the existing literature and the theoretical framework developed in 
this paper focus on the conditions that lead to the presence of non-activists. However, the 
framework’s emphasis on non-activists makes it is less informative for understanding the nuances 
between low-intensity – and  high-intensity activism. As non-activists only make up a small minority 
of political staffers, future research could benefit from a more fine-grained theoretical 
understanding of staffers as party activists.   
Conclusion 
This paper brings important nuances to professionalization and cartelization (Panebianco, 1988; 
Katz and Mair, 1995). The findings add to the existing evidence that professionalization has not 
resulted in the dominance of non-activist political staffers in parliamentary democracies (Webb and 
Fisher, 2003; Karlsen and Saglie, 2017). Despite decades of professionalization, a majority of 
political staffers in Belgium and the Netherlands remain strongly involved as high-intensity party 
activists – which confirms earlier studies from the UK (Webb and Fisher, 2003; Fisher and Webb, 
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2003) and Norway (Karlsen & Saglie, 2017). Admittedly, Panebianco (1988) described a 
longitudinal trend and only cross-sectional data are currently available. But even if a limited 
decrease in activism has indeed taken place since the catchallization of parties, several analyses 
demonstrate that the outcome is far more modest than it is often assumed. Moreover, the 
similarities between Belgian and Dutch staffers undercut the argument of the cartel party: Belgium’s 
higher level of public funding for parties has not led to lower party activism among staffers. As 
pointed out by Karlsen (2010), influential party models overemphasize the American, candidate-
centered campaigning dominated by independent consultants. In parliamentary democracies 
however, it appears that parties have established strong collective organizations with internal, party-
affiliated staffers.  
The high levels of party activism among staffers in parliamentary democracies can be explained by 
approaching their recruitment from a rational choice perspective. On the supply side, staff 
positions are more attractive to party activists than to outsiders because they strongly identify with 
the party. On the demand side, parties prefer party activists to guarantee that staffers share the 
same political objectives. However, supply and demand varies between different types of staff. 
Reinterpreting Panebianco’s concept of extra-political expertise (1988), I anticipated that party 
activism is less prevalent among staffers with extra-political expertise (policy and communication 
experts), ministerial staff and staffers from office-oriented and ideologically moderate parties.  
I set up an extensive original survey project among staffers from fourteen Belgian and Dutch 
parties (N=1009) to test these hypotheses. The analysis examined variation on three analytical 
levels. On the individual level, policy – and communication experts are less likely to be involved as 
party activists. On the party face level, non-activists are more common among those who work in 
ministerial offices. On the party level, party activism among staffers from office-oriented parties is 
widespread but shallow. A disproportionally large segment of their staff are low-intensity activists: 
formal party members without an active involvement as volunteers. The ideological profile of 
parties is also related to staffers’ party activism: staff from parties with a more extreme ideological 
profile are more involved as party activists.  
The mere existence of variation between staffers demonstrates that staffers’ party activism has not 
decreased universally as Panebianco initially expected (1988). Instead, I argue that this evolution 
has occurred for a particular subset of political staffers: policy – and communication experts and 
those who work in ministerial offices and ideologically moderate parties. In addition to classic 
individual-level typologies, these findings underline the importance of  contextual factors. In 
particular, parties’ hiring policies are strongly related to government participation, as they balance 
the need for loyalty and competence among staffers during recruitment. The strong impact of 
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government institutions is illustrated by comparing Belgium and the Netherlands. As shown by the 
multivariate analysis, the somewhat lower levels of party activism among Belgian staffers are caused 
by the existence of extensive ministerial offices with higher numbers of non-activists.  
From a normative perspective, it is beneficial to parties, voters and party democracy in general that 
most staffers are party activists who share the policy preferences of their party. As stipulated by 
the responsible party model, voters transfer decision-making power to elected elites by legitimizing 
a party’s policy goals during elections (Mair, 2008; Thomassen, 1994). When elected elites delegate 
a portion of this democratic mandate to unelected staffers, their dedication to the party’s policy 
goals keeps them aligned with the preferences of voters. This mechanism is especially important 
for staffers directly involved in democratic representation. Even among policy – and 
communication experts, however, only a small minority are non-activists.  
However, the strong connection between staffers’ party activism and government participation 
raises normative questions. Congruence between staffers and the party’s political objectives matters 
the most when parties can implement policies by participating in government. At this point, it 
remains unclear whether this signals an ideological gap with their parties’ support base. Future 
research could explore the mechanisms that hold this unelected elite politically accountable. 
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Appendix A. Participating parties (N=14)  
 
Party  
 
Country Party Family# 
Vote 
Share 
Total 
Staff 
Response 
rate 
Survey period 
Government 
Experience* 
Ideological 
Extremity° 
N-VA Belgium Conservative 20% 560 32% November 2018 - January 2019 39% 7,84 
CD&V Belgium Christian-Democratic 12% 521 33% December 2018 – March 2019  87% 0,16 
PS Belgium Socialist 12% 565 29% February 2019 - April 2019 88% 5,76 
VLD Belgium Liberal 10% 417 37% December 2018 - March 2019 69% 4 
Sp.a Belgium Socialist 9% 192 34% November 2018 – May 2019 71% 4 
Groen Belgium Green 5% 91 45% January 2019 - March 2019 17% 7,84 
PVDA-PTB Belgium Radical Left 4% 65 38% January 2019 - April 2019 0% 21,16 
Ecolo Belgium Green 3% 104 46% March 2019 – April 2019 31% 7,84 
Défi Belgium Liberal 2% 103 19% March 2019 – April 2019 16% 0,36 
VVD Netherlands Liberal 21% 107 51% October 2019 -  December 2019 68% 8,35 
D66 Netherlands Liberal 12% 93 47% September 2019 - November 2019 41% 0,31 
PvdA Netherlands Socialist 6% 62 48% September 2019 - January 2020 53% 1,78 
50Plus Netherlands Liberal 3% 27 22% October 2019 -  November 2019 0% 0,06 
SGP Netherlands Conservative 2% 29 48% December 2019 0% 9,68 
#: Parlgov Database      *: Parlgov Database, % of time in regional & national government since founding      °: CHES Database, square of distance from general L-R center       
 
  
Appendix B: variable distributions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix C. Bivariate Analyses 
Table B.1.: Prevalence of party activism among political staffers 
 Non-
activists 
Low-intensity 
activists 
High-intensity 
activists 
Tasks    
      Managers 3% * 24% 73% 
      Policy experts 16% ** 25% 60% * 
      Communication experts 14% 24% 63% 
      Political assistants 6% ** 22% 72% * 
      Party organizers 6% 13% ° 81% * 
      Administration & support 14% 29% 58%  
Party face    
      Central office 7% * 21% 72% * 
      Parliament 5% *** 25% 70% * 
      Ministerial office 19% *** 24% 57% *** 
Party family    
      Christian democrats  19% * 14% ** 68%  
      Liberals  18% ** 21%  62% 
      Social democrats 5% *** 42% *** 53% *** 
      Conservatives 12% 14% *** 75% ** 
      Ecologists 10% 20% 71% 
      Radical left 0% 0% * 100% *** 
Total 12% 24% 64% 
X2 tests (absolute value of adj. stand. residuals): ° > 1,645 ; * >1,96; ** >2,58; *** >3,29   
  
Appendix D. Logistic regressions 
 
Table C.1. Multicollinearity tests: VIF values 
Variables 
Current 
member 
Prior 
member 
Internal 
position 
Electoral 
candidate 
Tasks 1,194 1,024 1,029 1,027 
Party Face 1,027 1,219 1,224 1,214 
Government experience 1,147 1,461 1,533 1,533 
Ideological extremity 1,446 1,461 1,513 1,516 
Country 1,412 1,239 1,272 1,274 
Gender  1,017 1,018 1,025 1,024 
Age category 1,053 1,057 1,072 1,070 
  Note: Problematic multicollinearity: VIF >4 (Hair et al., 2010) to VIF >10 (Myers, 1990) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table C.2.: Understanding non-activism among staffers (N=934) 
 (I) 
Individual factors 
(II) 
Individual factors  
& party faces 
(III) 
Individual factors,  
party faces & parties 
Tasks  (ref.: Management) 
   Policy expert 
   Communication 
   Political assistant 
   Organization 
   Administrative 
 
 
5,035 (0,665) * 
4,000 (0,707) ° 
1,374 (0,741)  
1,192 (0,897) 
3,320 (0,707)° 
 
4,308 (0,671) * 
3,856 (0,715) ° 
2,927 (0,769) 
2,323 (0,962) 
2,940 (0,714) 
 
 
3,727 (0,674) ° 
3,501 (0,719) ° 
3,187 (0,770) 
1,873 (0,966) 
3,149 (0,717) 
Party faces   (ref.: Central Office) 
   Parliament  
   Ministerial office 
    
  
0,627 (0,490) 
3,408 (0,395) ** 
 
0,594 (0,495)  
3,229 (0,406) ** 
Parties 
  Government experience   
  Ideological extremity 
 
   
0,982 (0,005) *** 
0,887 (0,036)  ** 
Control variables 
  Belgium 
  Female 
  Age   (ref.: 18-35) 
    36-50 
    50+ 
 
 
2,216 (0,442) ° 
2,100 (0,218) ** 
 
0,619 (0,254) ° 
0,838 (0,280) 
 
0,901 (0,483) 
2,003 (0,222) ** 
 
0,544 (0,260) * 
0,718 (0,286) 
 
1,568 (0,512)  
1,925 (0,227) ** 
 
0,556 (0,264) * 
0,727 (0,293)  
Constant  0,016 (0,789) *** 0,020 (0,847) *** 0,070 (0,885) ** 
Nagelkerke’s R² 0,086 0,141 0,181 
Odd’s ratios & standard errors of stepwise multiple logistic regression; ° p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
  
Table C.4.: Understanding low-intensity activism among staffers (N=934) 
 
 (I) 
Individual factors 
(II) 
Individual factors  
& Party faces 
(III) 
Individual factors,  
Party faces & Parties 
Tasks  (ref.: Management) 
   Policy expert 
   Communication 
   Political assistant 
   Organization 
   Administrative 
 
 
0,906 (0,280) 
0,886 (0,328) 
0,840 (0,315) 
0,898 (0,390) 
1,153 (0,319) 
 
0,946 (0,283) 
0,883 (0,331) 
0,796 (0,327) 
0,777 (0,423) 
1,169 (0,323)  
 
0,908 (0,293) 
0,851 (0,341) 
0,696 (0,338) 
0,797 (0,440) 
1,102 (0,333)  
Party faces   (ref.: Central Office) 
   Parliament  
   Ministerial office    
 
  
0,926 (0,244) 
0,772 (0,221)  
 
0,858 (0,250)  
0,609 (0,231) * 
Parties 
  Government experience   
  Ideological extremity 
 
   
1,023 (0,004) *** 
0,999 (0,026)  
Control variables 
  Belgium 
  Female 
  Age   (ref.: 18-35) 
    36-50 
    50+ 
 
 
1,050 (0,241) 
1,302 (0,149) ° 
 
1,162 (0,173) 
1,046 (0,202) 
 
1,150 (0,254)  
1,316 (0,149) ° 
 
1,176 (0,173) 
1,071 (0,203)  
 
0,806 (0,272) 
1,330 (0,154) ° 
 
1,167 (0,180) 
0,979 (0,211)  
Constant  0,345 (0,354) * 0,362 (0,388) * 0,140 (0,474) *** 
Nagelkerke’s R² 0,010 0,013 0,092 
Odd’s ratios & standard errors of stepwise multiple logistic regression; ° p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .0 
  
Table C.3.: Understanding high-intensity activism among staffers (N=934) 
 
 (I) 
Individual factors 
(II) 
Individual factors  
& Party faces 
(III) 
Individual factors,  
Party faces & Parties 
Tasks  (ref.: Management) 
   Policy expert 
   Communication 
   Political assistant 
   Organization 
   Administrative 
 
 
0,748 (0,323) 
0,949 (0,377) 
1,104 (0,361) 
2,069 (0,526) 
0,862 (0,377) 
 
0,761 (0,324) 
0,941 (0,380) 
1,068 (0,375) 
1,874 (0,563) 
0,865 (0,381) 
 
0,759 (0,330) 
0,910 (0,387) 
1,152 (0,380) 
1,564 (0,571) 
0,887 (0,387) 
Party faces   (ref.: Central Office) 
   Parliament  
   Ministerial office    
 
  
0,941 (0,281) 
0,846 (0,261) 
 
0,989 (0,286) 
1,024 (0,272) 
Parties 
  Government experience   
  Ideological extremity 
 
   
0,981 (0,004) *** 
0,963 (0,029)  
Control variables 
  Belgium 
  Female 
  Age   (ref.: 18-35) 
    36-50 
    50+ 
 
 
1,125 (0,254) 
0,630 (0,173) * 
 
1,164 (0,199) 
0,956 (0,225)  
 
1,189 (0,412) 
0,634 (0,173) * 
 
1,175 (0,200) 
0,972 (0,226)  
 
1,673 (0,290) ° 
0,647 (0,176) * 
 
1,189 (0,205) 
1,008 (0,235) 
Constant  3,251 (0,390) * 3,396 (0,433) * 9,099 (0,532) *** 
Nagelkerke’s R² 0,029 0,030 0,073 
Odd’s ratios & standard errors of stepwise multiple logistic regression; ° p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
